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ABSTRACT 
The joint study of computer security, privacy and human-
computer interaction (HCI) over the last two decades has shaped a 
research agenda focused upon usable privacy & security. 
However, in HCI research more generally there has long been an 
awareness of the need to understand and design for user 
experience, in recognition of the complex and multi-faceted role 
that technology now plays in our lives. In this paper we add to the 
growing discussion by introducing the notion of experience-
centered privacy and security. We argue that in order to engage 
users of technology around issues related to experiences of privacy 
and security, research methods are required that may be outside of 
the normal repertoire of methods that we typically call upon. We 
describe three projects that developed non-typical research 
methods to reveal experiential insights into user interactions with 
privacy and security-related technologies. We conclude by 
proposing a research agenda that begins to illustrate how the 
discourse and methods of experience-centered design might serve 
to provide valuable alternative perspectives on new and enduring 
user-facing privacy and security problems.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In their 1996 article ‘User-centered security’, Zurko and Simon 
brought about a new paradigm in secure systems research that has 
in recent years become the predominant way to align information 
security and privacy with the consideration of human factors. This 
new paradigm called for the development of “security models, 
mechanisms, systems, and software that have usability as a 
primary motivation or goal [46]”. Today, nearly twenty years 
later, interactions with digital technologies—and their associated 
security and privacy features— now pervade almost all of human 
life. In the wider field of human-computer interaction (HCI), this 
reality has forced reflection not only regarding how technology is 
designed to account for the multifaceted lives of users, but also 
how we can understand design requirements and user needs in 
increasingly diverse contexts of use. For some time now, much 
HCI research has orientated towards understanding user 
experience [22]1 and designing in an experience-centered manner 
[43]. This approach reflects a new sensitivity to the complex role 
that technology now has in our lives, and that, today, successful 
technologies are those that respond sensibly to the needs and 
values of users, and are not necessarily those that are the most 
usable. Despite this wide acceptance that experience is a 
fundamental aspect of how we should study technology use and 
design new systems, this idea has been slow to find traction in 
information security and privacy research. 
In this paper, we argue that an experience-centered approach to 
privacy and security research is particularly appropriate, as many 
enduring concerns around understanding user behavior can only 
be explained experientially (e.g. user perceptions, mental models, 
trust, compliance etc.). For instance, people share passwords with 
partners, contrary to the conventional wisdom to not share 
passwords [18]; new user authentication systems that present 
security improvements over existing systems do not ‘feel’ secure 
[9], yet some supposedly antiquated and insecure systems do [38]. 
The difficulty in engaging with insights of this type using our 
predominant quantitative and qualitative methods means that we 
still have a lack of knowledge about the subjective yet 
fundamental ways that people make security and privacy 
decisions, reflect upon those decisions, and express needs. Of 
course, in this area, attackers have long been more attentive to the 
experiential underpinnings of digital technologies than designers 
themselves [23].  
Attending to the challenge of studying and designing the 
experiential aspects of security and privacy technologies is 
difficult. Indeed, design problems in these domains can be thought 
of as wicked problems [30]: problems that are difficult to define; 
are interconnected with other problems; and have other 
complicating characteristics that inhibit overarching insights and 
all-encompassing solutions. Approaching problems of this type 
requires the application of research methods that embrace—rather 
                                                                 
1 User experience is a widely used/abused term. For our purposes the 
consideration of experience encompasses the practical and affective 
aspects of interaction with technology [22].  
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than abstract away—the complexity of modern day interactions 
with technology. Our contribution in this paper is to enhance the 
debate of the applicability of experience-centered methods to 
problems in security and privacy [20,21]. We firstly identify 
challenges currently facing empirical user research in this domain; 
secondly, we describe three case studies that developed and 
applied experience-centered methods to uncover security and/or 
privacy insights. In doing so we aim to invigorate discussion 
around who participates in our empirical research and indeed, how 
they participate. To conclude, we propose specific future 
challenges and opportunities that an experience-centered approach 
might bring to security and privacy research. 
2. HCI FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
The evolution of the field of HCI’s thinking about users in the 
context of security and privacy technologies has been widely 
recounted (e.g. [21]). Here we revisit it briefly as a foundation for 
describing our experience-centered approach. 
Information security has its roots in the military, where users were 
treated principally as a source of threats. The pursuit of public-key 
cryptography carried with it the hopes of a future world of secure 
communications for everyone. This hope eroded in the 1970s with 
the realization that contextual factors could undermine the 
cryptography itself. The potential impact of usability upon security 
was noted in 1975 by Saltzer and Schroeder [31]; twenty-four 
years later and their concerns of designing security with the 
assumption of an ‘expert user’ were born out when Whitten and 
Tygar performed an evaluation of Pretty Good Privacy with 
damning usability results and significant security implications 
[41]. Further, Davis [5] suggested that public-key infrastructures 
were not suitable for non-expert users, and that many of their 
operational benefits were only brought about by this problematic 
assumption of expert users. Around the same time, Zurko and 
Simon [46] proposed that learning from techniques used in HCI 
could help the security community improve their ability to design 
systems suitable for the average user. Furthermore, the adoption of 
frameworks of usability appeared compatible with the 
mathematical roots of the field. The following years would 
confirm the value of usability as a critical consideration in the 
design and evaluation of user-facing privacy and security 
mechanisms [3]. 
2.1 Understanding Users in the field of 
Computer Privacy and Security 
It is challenging to understand the needs and practices of users in 
the context of information security and privacy, as these 
dimensions of digital technology are considered to be secondary 
concerns for users [41]. Also, the technologies we design must 
fulfil the difficult task of warning users about abstract threats, or 
requesting decisions on matters that users may not fully 
understand. In response, research has focused upon a number of 
pressing areas including: persuading users to behave more 
securely [13]; preventing users from behaving insecurely [44]; 
scaffolding usable functionality around systems with poor 
usability [11]; proposing systems that take better account of 
human cognitive limitations [1] or to educate users about the 
threats they may face [33]. The particular research methods that 
are applied to judge the success of an intervention or to capture 
user requirements greatly influence the insights that will be 
revealed. For instance, it is widely known that behavioual research 
study designs are subject to a myriad of demand characteristics 
[26], particularly where they focused upon studying what people 
do, and why they do it. For example, participants may sense that a 
study is checking up on their security or privacy hygiene and may 
not wish to disclose any deviance from ‘responsible’ behavior as 
this might create opportunities for unwanted judgment of their 
personal values or routines. This is accompanied by the additional 
issue that participants may find it difficult to articulate their 
practices or needs on technical matters, or indeed may be 
embarrassed to reveal a lack of interest in such an apparently 
important topic. This reality can often be invisible to researchers 
due to the pervasive nature of verbal or written ‘good practice’ in 
society, which means that people with very little knowledge of the 
subject matter might still be able to assemble convincing accounts 
of highly conscientious practices, even if their personal 
understanding does not align with the vocabulary they are using. A 
qualitative approach, in and of itself, is not a solution, as such 
studies can suffer from the same biases too.  As a result, we often 
see a dichotomy in terms of what people say they do, and what 
they actually do. These results are usually rationalized by asserting 
that users themselves are irrational and not aware of the 
importance of foregrounding these matters in their everyday lives. 
An alternative perspective could be that people have their own 
values in this area that are poorly understood and not yet valued in 
how privacy and security technologies are designed.     
Of course, the problem of understanding and studying subjective 
preferences and tacit behaviors appears to be a class of problem 
often referred to as a wicked problem [30]. Problems with these 
characteristics are often referred to as being “fuzzy” in informal 
discourse. This outlook actually discounts that a number of core 
concerns in security and privacy have considerable wicked 
components. User authentication can be considered one such 
wicked problem; the problem of gaining secure access to a 
computer system. Indeed, the absence of a silver bullet 
authentication solution after extensive research over the years has 
forced reflection upon why the study of usability and security has 
so far not identified a successor to the password [16]. This multi-
faceted problem encompasses the challenge of technical design 
(e.g. password entropy), policy design, user trust, perceptions of 
security, and uncertainty of how users might appropriate 
authentication technologies into their lives. User authentication -- 
like many digital security and privacy issues – reflects a hard 
social problem. The desire to design better technology in the face 
of such complexity requires conceptualising security and privacy 
technologies in much broader terms; and requires that researchers 
apply methods that capture hidden user needs or tacit practices 
related to how people treat security and privacy as an everyday 
problem [8], and as a collective practice [7]. 
3. EXPERIENCE-CENTERED DESIGN AND 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
In their call for experience-centered design, McCarthy and Wright 
[43] consider understanding human lived experience as a route to 
bridging the gap between those who design and those who live 
with technologies. Central to experience-centered design is the 
notion of empathy. Empathy in a design process is about 
remembering your own view of the world while seeing the world 
through the eyes of somebody else. Our ability to empathize with 
a person, to identify their feelings and understand their 
perspectives is challenging; particularly in contexts where we 
work with people who may find it difficult to recognize or 
articulate their own needs, or who may see the world very 
differently to the designer [42]. Much of what we know of the 
world, and our skilled behavior is tacit, and much of an 
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experience-centered design process is about making this tacit 
knowledge visible. As such, an experience-centered approach 
prioritizes the need to develop a rich understanding of people’s 
practices and lives.  
Such an outlook provokes reflection upon how we currently ask 
users to contribute to security and privacy research. Users tend not 
to be experts on the subject, which creates an asymmetric 
relationship between designers and the users they encounter. This 
dynamic implicitly lends itself to a designer assuming the role of a 
‘protector’, in that their values are quite likely to take precedence 
over the values of the user. We are not advocating that we should 
be blindly responsive to what users want in future technologies, 
but we do advocate that researchers should have a greater 
awareness of what users can contribute to the design of those 
technologies. As researchers, we bring expertise of security, 
privacy, and technology design, but users also bring expertise in 
terms of how they live their lives, how existing or proposed 
technologies fit into their routines, what is of value to them and 
what they aspire to in the future. 
An experience-centered approach takes that dialogue is  crucial to 
creating parity between designer and user. If we are to take the 
meaning of dialogue seriously, then it means more than simply 
interviewing and talking to potential users. Indeed, dialogue 
implies: (i) openness and creativity in how we engage with others; 
(ii) responsiveness to another’s needs, aspirations and concerns; 
(iii) actively listening and withholding judgment [43]. Storytelling 
is a common vehicle to engage someone in  dialogue—indeed, 
recent research has even suggested the value of user storytelling in 
relation to security issues [28]. Considering these three facets and 
the notion of storytelling, we can see how an interview protocol 
that runs through a list of pre-determined questions is not 
dialogue.  
We suggest that security and privacy research should take 
seriously the ideas from experience-centered design where it must: 
develop an understanding of context-specific user practices (what 
they are, and why they happen); gain fundamental insights into 
subjective user perceptions of security or privacy; theorize about 
the fit of technologies into people’s lives; or generate inspiration 
for new technology. Doing so may facilitate a more discursive 
approach to studying and exploring the behavior of users, and 
enable the research community to more actively probe the 
everyday relationship between people, security and privacy. In 
making this argument, we build upon Mathiasen and Bødker’s 
[20] first articulation of the implications that human experience 
has to security. In this earlier work, a new method was proposed 
called ‘acting out security’ as a means to enable people to envision 
using a future payment system. Other archetypal methods 
proposed in this space include scenarios, role-plays, probes and 
experience prototypes [43]. While these are common methods that 
could be used already, our experience of using experience-
centered design methods in sensitive contexts has highlighted how 
very often our methods of engagement must be tailored to the 
problem under investigation, and the user group of focus.  
In the following we describe three case studies that provide 
examples of how experience-centered methods can be developed 
to yield non-trivial privacy and security insights and new 
perspectives on user participation in privacy and security research. 
These case studies are not intended to represent a gold standard in 
how to conduct this type of research. Indeed, every context should 
be considered differently. Instead we provide these examples as 
ways of articulating the benefits of using methods of experience-
centered user engagement that take seriously the notions of 
openness, creativity, responsiveness and actively listening. In each 
case study the overall project motivations are briefly described, 
but we focus on an exemplar method of user engagement that was 
important as a means to facilitate dialogue around existing security 
or privacy practices.  
4. CASE STUDY 1: VOME 
Visualization and Other Methods of Expression (VOME) was an 
interdisciplinary project that focused on questions related to 
privacy, identity and consent in online services. From the start, 
VOME set out to engage with under-represented communities 
who, to date, had not been included in privacy design studies and 
therefore addressed the fundamental question ‘Usable privacy for 
whom?’. The inclusion of local government authority as a project 
partner focused the project on privacy in the context of public 
service delivery, and many of the project’s case studies and user 
participation came from economically deprived communities 
within the region. One such case study was the development of a 
series of new online services aimed at teenagers who were at risk 
of offending. This included new smartcard-based schemes where 
children from poor families were given credits that could be used 
to pay for ‘positive activities’ across the city. Issues of trust, 
conflicting perceptions of security and different perceptions of risk 
were amongst a number of issues that could not be teased out 
using traditional research methods. 
4.1. Methods 
In VOME, there was an emphasis on exploring experiences and 
feelings related to being online. The methods of engagement  
 
 
Figure 1: Online privacy discussion captured on a collage created in a railway station with engagement led by an actor. 
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 developed in this project were chosen to explore how members of 
the public felt about security and encouraged a pluralist approach 
where different and often conflicting views were articulated. The 
findings from public engagements were used to develop thinking 
tools that helped users explore the privacy issues and decide how 
to respond to questions related to what information to share, when, 
and with whom.  
4.1.1. Highlighted Method: Collage Building 
The collage building approach is a participative activity in which 
four simple research questions were asked about topics related to 
online privacy using language that resonated with the participant 
groups. In some instances, rather than use researchers to ask initial 
questions, performance artists were used to engage participants 
and ask the initial questions. For example, one engagement was 
conducted in a railway station where participants were 
spontaneously recruited with the assistance of a performer (see 
Figure 1). Participants were asked four questions: what secrets do 
you keep online? What secrets do you look for online? Tell us 
something about yourself that nobody knows online; Tell us a 
secret about where you live. Participants could choose a minimum 
of two out of four methods of engagement to address these 
questions: drawing pictures of secrets, recording verbal answers, 
writing responses and taking photographs that visualized their 
response.  
The insights gained from the collage building activities 
highlighted that for many of those to whom we spoke, a prominent 
concern is around secrets related to relationships and relationship 
management. This is also repeated in the recorded narratives that 
we collected. In contrast, participants regarded deception with 
regards to others gaining access to personal and biographical 
details such as age and name as routine and not of significance. In 
particular the collage brought out the important point of 
“playfulness” in the context of social media use and 
authentication. Traditionally, authentication technologies such as 
passwords and smart cards are evaluated in terms of their usability 
and in terms of their strength against guessing attacks. The 
responses on the collage show that in the case of social media, 
bypassing password mechanisms is a common activity in close 
relationships and seen as a playful activity. 
The responses on the collage also illustrated the wicked problem 
of social media users being both the hunter and the hunted. Many 
contributions articulate how social media users like to keep secrets 
online but also find out the secrets of others. This highlights the 
playfulness of system subversion in certain contexts. This playful 
duality is an important point for consideration when designing 
online safety messages and online safety functionality. Current  
 
work in this area focuses on the social media user as a potential 
victim, ignoring the fact that the same individuals may also be 
willing to subvert the system and might regard both carrying out 
and being the target of such actions as a form of game. This 
further introduces the problem of these actions being interpreted 
and re-interpreted differently over time with actions that were 
once regarded as playful being re-interpreted as sinister if the 
relationship breaks down. An important principle that underpins 
the collage building as a method for experience-centered privacy 
is that it is constructed in a public place with participants 
controlling what is disclosed and how it is presented. Using this 
research approach, participation took place on the terms of the 
participants. The collage encouraged the use of language natural 
for the local community, and encouraged participants to talk about 
subjects on which they were familiar and knowledgeable. This 
method also leveraged participatory techniques to create a space in 
which researchers and participants could work together to draw 
out the more tacit aspects of information production and sharing. 
5. CASE STUDY 2: BANKING FOR THE 
OLDER OLD 
‘New Approaches to Banking for the Older Old’ was a project that 
examined the financial practices of ‘eighty somethings’ (people 
aged over 80 years) in the UK. The project’s scope was to 
understand the ways in which this age group managed their 
finances and identify reasons why they may be excluded from 
benefitting from technological innovations to banking services and 
payment systems. During the time that the research was 
undertaken there were a number of important changes to how 
people received their state pensions in Britain. Those who had for 
years relied on cash were now being forced to open bank accounts 
in order to receive their weekly payments. Furthermore, the 
banking industry was at the same time threatening to withdraw 
cheques (‘checks’ in the USA and Canada) [38] from 
circulation—a payment method that large numbers of this age 
group relied upon. Many of the participants raised the latter as a 
primary issue of concern during workshops with researchers. As a 
result, much of the project focused on exploring the trust 
mechanisms underlying cheques and developing services and 
technologies that allowed people to keep using this payment 
method once the banks withdrew this service. 
5.1. Methods 
Providing a context where people felt comfortable talking about 
their personal finances with others was a fundamental issue the 
researchers had to address. The project began with typical 
ethnographic work, and a number of novel methodological 
approaches were developed to support engagement with 
participants. Noting that it would be difficult for people to discuss 
  
Figure 2: Examples of speculative ideas for security technologies presented on ‘questionable concept’ cards [37]: (i) Disappearing 
money; (ii) smart wallet; (iii) biometric pin thimble; (iv) content inside the card itself. 
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their finances with a stranger, the researchers used a ‘financial 
biography’ approach to interviewing participants. This focused on 
having participants talk about their life story with more focused 
follow-up questions about finances as they related key stages in 
their lives. Later in the project, techniques such as questionable 
concepts, and technology prototyping facilitated both public and 
private disclosures of financial and security practices. 
5.1.1. Highlighted Method: Questionable Concepts 
Questionable concepts [37] was a method used by the researchers 
to link their initial ethnographic fieldwork with later co-design 
sessions with new groups of eighty somethings. The concepts 
themselves were critical design responses to some of the problems 
revealed from the ethnography stage of the research. For example, 
one of the concepts, ‘disappearing money’, speculated the 
existence of intelligent banknotes where the Queen’s face and the 
value of the note disappeared when handled by an unauthorized 
person. The idea, albeit deeply speculative, was grounded in issues 
emerging from the ethnographic data where housebound 
participants found themselves reliant on friends, neighbors and 
carers to pay for bills or purchase groceries on their behalf. It had 
been noticed that there was an implicit trust of those they handed 
money over to—yet there had been occasions where cash had 
gone missing, or where participants had shared their debit cards 
and PINs and had money stolen from their account. Therefore, 
‘disappearing money’ was both a practical and questionable 
response to these problems. It speculated novel authentication 
approaches where money could be exchanged with an 
intermediary but only spent in specific shops or locations. Yet at 
the same time it challenged the very trust mechanisms that the 
eighty somethings valued. During meetings with participants, the 
discussion around speculative ideas like this gave the researchers 
insight into how participants formed mental models and 
perceptions of trust and security around the perceived qualities of 
future technological systems.  
In order to link the ethnographic and the co-design phases of the 
project, the questionable concepts were placed onto cards that 
were given to participants to take away following an initial design 
workshop. The cards had an illustration of the concept on the front 
(see Figure 2 for an example). On the inside there was a brief 
description of the idea and a number of quotes from the financial 
biographies that the design was based upon. The remainder of the 
card posed a series of open questions for participants to respond 
to. These questions were intended to gauge how much these 
individuals shared the concerns and experiences of prior 
participants and for them to imagine future scenarios. 
As a method for experience-centered security, questionable 
concepts was a valuable tool for a number of reasons. First, they 
offered participants an opportunity to reflect on the needs of others 
and empathize with how their personal circumstances were 
different to those we had worked with earlier in the project. 
Second, the sheer ‘questionability’ of the concepts presented 
numerous opportunities for critique. Participants would register 
their disdain for the ideas in a variety of ways—by scribbling over 
ideas, by writing “wrong!” or “never!” over the participant 
quotes; by writing long responses to questions pertaining to the 
deep problems within society that they associated with the 
suggested ideas; or by simply deciding not to answer any 
questions on specific cards. These criticisms, however, provided 
rich insight into what the participants truly valued. For example, 
negative reactions to the ‘smart purse’ lead to written responses 
and workshop discussions around the role of keeping meticulous 
records of financial transactions. It appeared that the effort of 
making these records and keeping them up to date provided a deep 
sense of security and comfort. Participants “knew where they 
were” money-wise at any point in time, and could challenge their 
banks if they felt there were inaccuracies in their computerized 
records. Responses to ‘disappearing money’ were similarly 
critical, where a number of participants noted that such 
sophisticated but non-digital payment methods already existed, 
referring to the paper cheque that was in the process of being 
abolished. The power of the method was in harnessing critiques in 
a way that allowed participants to articulate their existing practices 
(without interrogation) and state very clearly their meaning as with 
respect to these unusual ideas the research team presented to them.  
Crucially, the insights generated from the questionable concept 
cards led to new design directions focusing on the experiential 
phenomena surrounding banking and finances. For example, a 
community-based cheque service was developed with participants 
that privileged the need for record keeping and provided a 
payment method that could be kept within a local community of 
trusted payees and service providers [36].  
6. CASE STUDY 3: PRIVACY IN ABUSIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The final project was a long-term collaboration between an 
international women’s center and charity in the UK that provides 
counseling, social support and education for women leaving 
abusive relationships. Our first phase of research was to 
understand how women that come to the center managed privacy 
in light of their changes in circumstance. Our focus was in 
identifying tensions and conflicts in their use of photo taking and 
sharing technologies. The study was developed against a backdrop 
of increased government support through the Ministry of Justice 
advocating the value of social networks for women leaving 
abusive relationships.  
 
Figure 3: Inspiration tokens with portrait pack and collage of photographs created by one of the women in the workshops [2]. 
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Increasingly, staff at the center were aware of digital content being 
appropriated as a means of continued control asserted by the 
perpetrator. At the same time, staff highlighted that women also 
enjoyed taking digital photographs and sharing them among one 
another as a means of building friendships. The research then 
largely focused on understanding photo-practices in the center 
through action research and participatory art practice and 
techniques. Through a series of workshops, women who used the 
center shared photographs that were meaningful for them while 
avoiding disclosing private information online to others and 
discussing their concerns in a safe trusted environment. 
6.1. Methods 
Understanding what privacy means for women in the context of 
moving on from abusive relationships presented a number of 
methodological challenges. Conducting interviews would have 
been difficult since the women were often nervous around people 
who were unfamiliar and were particularly suspicious of people 
from large institutions such as universities. Initial fieldwork and a 
digital storytelling project was initiated to engage the women in 
building relationships and confidence with the researcher around 
their common experiences. These early engagements underlined 
an awareness of the consequences of disclosing what might be 
perceived as inappropriate visual imagery to friends, family and 
center staff and an acute awareness of the importance of 
presenting the right kind of positive image. Following this we 
developed an approach we called digital portraits, which extended 
the storytelling process to specifically consider how photo-sharing 
practices were managed by privacy concerns.  
6.1.1. Highlighted method: Digital portraits 
The digital portraits approach was used as a design method, akin 
to the cultural probe [14], but with an extended period of 
engagement with a small group of women at the center. The 
approach built upon our earlier fieldwork and digital storytelling 
sessions, highlighting creativity, adaptability, and resilience in the 
women’s abilities in managing complexity. Rather than focusing 
on the managing of photographic privacy as a problem, we 
underlined the more generative potential of privacy as an issue of 
personal appropriate choices, choices that were highly attuned to 
each individual woman’s circumstances.  
The approach served as a means of paying particular attention to 
how the women visually negotiated their privacy preferences in 
the context of the center. Like cultural probes, a portrait pack (see 
Figure 3) was created that contained a portrait frame and a set of 
inspiration tokens, a digital sound recorder and digital camera in a 
velvet bag with a set of instructions. The instructions asked the 
women to take photographs of the things in their lives they valued 
and use the tokens for inspiration if they were stuck for ideas. The 
women were encouraged to only bring photographs to workshops 
that they were comfortable sharing with others. Over several 
weeks, each of the participants created a collage and video 
sequence with the photographs they had chosen. They wrote 
words or chose music to go alongside their images, reviewed their 
videos and made changes in light of sharing these with staff, other 
women at the center and the researchers. Finally, a selection of 
statements was presented back to the women and the center’s staff 
for further reflection and discussion.  
Digital portraits was a valuable method to gain nuanced insights 
for experience-centered privacy, which would have been 
overlooked using more traditional privacy heuristics. Participants 
were encouraged to reflect on their sharing preferences in response 
to a practical and situated task and reflect on those choices 
dynamically over a number of weeks. In doing so, tacit decision-
making processes in relation to images were tried out and changed 
in response to other women’s choices and the context. The 
longitudinal nature of the work also enabled trust to be built 
between researchers and participants. This meant the women 
became more comfortable disclosing issues and concerns 
associated with the sharing of the photographs that otherwise may 
not have been shared.  
Most importantly the method challenged researcher and staff 
assumptions on what privacy meant in the context of photo-
sharing in the center, in particular on how logical, rational choices 
were difficult to make. Furthermore it encouraged a re-thinking of 
photographic material as more than just data or information. 
Focusing on visual representation and decision making to create 
photographic content emphasized the value the women placed on 
their image making capacity and their ability for meanings to 
change over time. This eventually led to the design of a digital 
photo-album for use at the center that enabled a more situated 
negotiation of privacy over photographs on the display that also 
supported sociality and discussion. 
7. REFLECTIONS 
The three projects we have described generated security or privacy 
insights by using methods tailored specifically to the participants 
and settings involved. These methods were chosen to create an 
appropriate context within which the participants would feel 
comfortable to explore the issues the researchers had in mind; 
particularly important given the potential vulnerability of some of 
the participants. Broadly speaking, the goal in each project was to 
reduce the distance between the designer and the user, to allow the 
designer to become exposed to the lived experiences that have 
shaped the person throughout their life, and that in turn have 
shaped their relationship with security and privacy facing 
technologies. The methods we have described require an inter-
disciplinary approach to research. They also require being open to 
appreciating that the life experiences of specific individuals can 
mean people see and make sense of the world quite differently to a 
designer of security or privacy technologies. Grounding a design 
discussion on a particular group of individuals and understanding 
their goals in life, enables a concrete yet rich and vivid discussion 
of how technology might fit into their lives and the trade-offs that 
might be acceptable for that particular group. This contrasts to a 
discussion around the needs of an abstracted user, where, in the 
worst case, the lack of concreteness created in discussion around 
user needs and goals can increase the temptation for designers to 
make design decisions favorable only to themselves. 
The VOME project sought to encourage the participation in 
research of those who might otherwise be hard to reach in a 
typical participant recruitment process. Collage building enabled 
data collection in a public place with high public traffic. In 
addition, the project created a space to enable participants to feel 
confident to talk about topics they were comfortable with, and 
enabled them to drive the direction of the conversation. Dialogue 
was supported here through the multiplicity of voices that started 
to be built up along the collage—we saw how people would 
comment and respond to content contributed from others. The 
project focused upon financial practices also actively engaged 
participants that would not typically be involved in the design of 
new technologies. Due to the particular experiences that that age 
group had with technology, new methods were required to support 
the participants to envision future systems and develop awareness 
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of the needs they currently had with respect to making payments. 
In these workshops, dialogue was supported through the 
commentary and critique of the ideas developed in response to the 
earlier ethnographic work on the project. Frequently, participants 
would comment on the practices of others that were in sharp 
contrast to their own—be these fellow participants, the quotes on 
the cards from earlier participants, and indeed the younger 
researchers who facilitated the workshops. In these workshops, 
actively listening to people’s stories related to finances was 
appreciated and encouraged, as was being open to the idea that 
personal finances is a highly personalized matter. The project 
related to privacy and abusive relationships also aimed to reach a 
group not typically accounted for in the design of digital 
technologies and gain insights into privacy after such a disruptive 
life event. The highly sensitive nature of this work demanded a 
longitudinal engagement in order to create an environment where 
issues to do with privacy could be probed and observed. This 
project highlighted the importance of responsiveness—in this 
case, responding to the sensitive subject manner through a method 
of engagement and subtle probing techniques that meant issues of 
privacy emerged but were not the focal point of the research 
activity. 
Each case study engaged with groups that have amplified needs in 
some sense. It is an accepted tenet of security research to study the 
most challenging threat model for a particular system. As such it is 
likely that studying a challenging group of users can lead to 
similarly useful insights that would benefit future system design 
for the wider population. Despite this, an increasing amount of 
research in the usable privacy and security community takes place 
on crowdsourcing platforms such as MTurk which supports the 
spontaneous conducting of large remote studies with statistical 
consensus as their core concern. While this has eradicated issues 
of sample size in experiment design, what is also achieved is more 
distance between those who design security and privacy 
technologies and those that use them. This is to say that 
researchers must be careful in choosing and developing 
appropriate methods that balance the need to obtain statistical 
consensus (mindful of the limitations of null hypothesis 
significance testing [4]) and adequately capture the voices of those 
who might encounter the technologies that we design.  
Each case study aimed to address a very local agenda with respect 
to security and privacy. Typically in computer science, our 
empirical work is subject to concerns of generalizability. These 
case studies do not provide generalizable results; however, there 
are big questions about useful the generated insights might have 
been without this intense, and sometimes very messy, engagement 
with people [15]. In each case, the process of the research 
including the building of intermediate prototypes and designing 
our engagement with people supports the generation of knowledge 
around that specific context and the people in it. In this way, the 
research process is not just a means to end, but is a crucial process 
that generates knowledge. Hayes [15] continues to describe how 
scientific rigor is achieved by this approach through discussion 
around the trustworthiness of results rather than generalizability; 
where trustworthiness is composed of credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability [35]. The goal has to be to build 
a interpretative yet cumulative discipline around our 
understanding of users, and to employ a mix of methods to 
generate evidence to argue that our security and privacy 
technologies will be useful in the long-term in the real world. 
8. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
“I am suggesting that some of the past and current importance 
attached to user interface design for information appliances may 
be due to the low user value of the appliances themselves. If this is 
so, then designers would be better employed in creating useful 
appliances than in trying to make valueless ones easy to use.” [6] 
The quote above by Derrett [6] was made after arguing that a 
bassoon, while totally unusable in the traditional sense, can still 
be: highly valued; used regularly (by choice); be aligned with the 
aspirations of the user; and support a particular social identity. 
Derrett’s argument hints that usability should not be considered as 
an end in and of itself, but should form part of a broader 
perspective of what makes technology successful in people’s lives. 
This argument creates a quandary for security and privacy 
researchers due to one common mantra that their technologies are 
a secondary concern for users, and that researchers have the 
burden to design technologies that people do not want to use (e.g. 
[41]). However, following Derrett’s point for a moment requires 
us to immediately confront interesting questions such as: can user-
facing security and privacy technologies be considered ‘useful’ 
and ‘high value’ to people? To begin to answer this question is no 
small task, however does require us to broaden our perspectives on 
studying users, and take seriously the need to understand people’s 
lived experiences with security and privacy technologies.  
Having provided some examples of experience-centered research 
approaches that aimed to capture and study people’s experiences 
of security and privacy, we can now consider some potential 
future research directions. New collaborations must likely be 
forged to explore these proposals (user experience can be 
composed of as many as 6 disciplines [24]). The challenge that 
this paper sets out is to understand how these proposed directions 
(and others with similar goals) might best help to build more 
successful secure or privacy-respectful systems that must be used 
by people. 
8.1. Design in security and privacy research 
One of the tenets that accompanied the initial wave of user-
centered security research was the rejection of ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches to system design. The impact of this thinking has 
prompted the design and evaluation of a myriad of different 
system designs to approach pressing security problems, but much 
less work on the trade-offs required to align or fine-tune 
technologies with specific deployment contexts or specific groups 
of people. Such trade-offs are made in a process of design. While 
design work can be conducted without user involvement e.g. 
generative design (arguably typical in security and privacy 
research), where technology is designed according to pre-existing 
rules or heuristics, each of our case studies highlight how eventual 
end-users can be more proactively engaged in the process at an 
early stage of research. Indeed, Mathiasen and Bødker [21] have 
proposed that participatory design is one design approach that 
would be beneficial in a security context. This means that users 
actively contribute to the design of a system so that the resulting 
system accounts for their practices and expertise. While taking an 
experience-centered approach does not necessarily mean 
undertaking participatory design, there is a shared appreciation 
that an individual’s experience and values must be accounted for 
at the early stages of a project. Additional challenges brought 
about by the context of privacy and security include that it may be 
challenging to identify the concrete design implications that allow 
us to work towards a meaningful and useful technology. Of 
course, incorporating user-centered design activities (including 
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usability evaluation) into the design cycle has long been a concern 
in the design of secure and usable systems [12]—but it is likely 
that this debate needs to be renewed by the proposal of additional 
complexity of early user involvement in a design process. Norman 
[24] advocates a “design-it-in” rather than a “test-it-in” approach 
to developing new technology, due to the fact that user testing 
typically occurs late in a project, and discovering the need for 
significant system modifications may not be welcome to project 
stakeholders at that late stage.  
8.2. A local agenda for security and privacy  
When designing security and privacy technologies, there is a 
tendency to think about designing for large numbers of users, and 
the generalizability of solutions is often an important criteria of its 
perceived utility. Focusing upon a large group of users can make it 
easy to become detached from the implications of user-hostile 
design decisions. One interesting and provocative research 
direction could involve designing systems that are bespoke for 
much smaller groups of people. The benefit of this approach 
would be that a deep understanding of a small group would need 
to be obtained, and the burden would be upon the researcher to 
enter into dialogue with a group of people to generate ideas for a 
new technology, and fit the technology into the lives of that group 
(that can be realistically assembled in the same room). This might 
provide a useful design exercise that provides a different 
perspective to how we design security and privacy more generally, 
and reduce the pressure upon researchers to focus upon developing 
technologies scalable to hundreds of thousands (or millions) of 
people. This can raise interesting questions, such as what would 
bespoke user authentication look like across the devices of a 
specific user? How would privacy interfaces look if they were 
designed to support a specific cultural norm? How different is the 
collaboratively designed technology from the conventional 
solution to a particular problem? And, did we discover design 
features from this exercise that would benefit much larger groups? 
8.3. An indirect focus upon privacy & security 
One of our case studies was not originally intended to explore 
security or privacy issues explicitly. However, in each example, 
issues such as trust, security and privacy often emerged, and 
became foregrounded in the interactions with participants. As 
computing has long since diffused out of the workplace and into 
most aspects of our lives, it is likely that insights can be gained by 
the study of contexts that do not, on the surface, have strong 
security or privacy connotations. Such an approach can expose 
researchers to the myriad of new ways that security and privacy is 
handled by people as an everyday practical problem [8], where 
participants will not feel defensive about their security and privacy 
practices or the workarounds they develop. One striking example 
of this is provided by Pritchard et al. [27] who conducted 
interviews with London bus drivers focused upon how new 
deployments of location-based services on buses had affected their 
ability to drive buses to a time schedule. Amongst other things, the 
interviews actually uncovered a pervasive awareness of the 
technology being used to conduct surveillance on the drivers, and 
the workarounds drivers employed to subvert the surveillance 
structures that the technology facilitated. Research in these 
contexts can provide an opportunity to take fresh perspectives 
upon how security and privacy technologies are appropriated and 
provide opportunities for design where there may not be an 
overbearing legacy of best practice to address the problems 
uncovered. 
8.4. Security and privacy across the life-course 
There is soon to be born a generation of people (if they haven’t 
been born already) who will experience a complete lifespan in the 
digital age. For these individuals, attitudes to privacy and security 
will likely be informed by their early experiences with digital 
technologies. This creates the need to understand the earliest 
experiences that individuals have encountering and managing 
personal privacy and security, but also how these attitudes and 
practices are shaped across the life course either naturally or 
through significant life events. Important transitions in life such as 
entering teenage years, marriage, and even encountering or 
contemplating the death of a loved one [19], can lead to long-held 
values being questioned and reconfigured by the new 
circumstances. Work in this area appears to be on the increase. 
Work has described how children are increasingly encountering 
digital technologies at a young age which challenges our 
traditional notions of privacy or security [32]. Research has also 
started to explore the role that children can play in the 
participatory design of the security features of children’s 
technologies [29]. Some work has explored how older adults build 
trust in seemingly antiquated paper payment technologies [38] and 
first explorations of how security and privacy technologies affect 
the bereaved have taken place [19]. These insights can potentially 
facilitate discourse around how experiences and perceptions of 
privacy and security change through life events and the ways in 
which systems experienced earlier in life influence preferences 
later in life.  
8.5. ‘In the wild’ & ‘extreme’ contexts 
Conducting field studies of security and privacy technologies has 
recently emerged as an important avenue of research. The 
emergence of mobile devices has made field studies a much more 
necessary evaluation approach e.g. [45]. However, it is likely that 
we can make further use of field studies to capture experiential 
insights into attitudes and behaviors. Research and practice focus 
has traditionally placed the organization as the defining context in 
security and privacy research (although this is changing). 
Organizational contexts can be characterized by people being of 
working age (i.e. roughly 18-65 years old), being of moderate 
intelligence and IT proficient, and with employee behavior being 
malleable to some extent by employers. While insights in this 
context are important, other contexts can be considered much 
more volatile, yet their study can serve to help us question our 
own values of what we as researchers consider to be important in 
security and privacy design. For example, ethnographic work has 
provided insights into how remote islanders delegate payments to 
one individual who boards a plane to the Australian mainland to 
carry out the banking for a entire village [34], or the trust practices 
of older adults who were dependent upon strangers to manage and 
obtain cash to live their everyday lives [10]. In such contexts it 
might be impossible to make appropriate trade-offs to design 
reasonably secure and useful systems. However, studying such 
contexts can make researchers increasingly sensitive to the 
assumption-breaking contexts in which their technologies might 
be deployed. A typical concern might relate to the generalizability 
of such contexts, however, such scenarios tend to make more 
pronounced the needs that many of us have anyway.  
8.6. Probing security and privacy experiences 
Finally, we need to consider new ways in which we may engage 
people in articulating concerns and experiences surrounding 
privacy and security. We noted earlier that people can have fine-
tuned practices around privacy and security but may be reluctant 
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or have difficulty to explicitly explain those practices and their 
associated motivations. Storytelling is an important feature of 
experience-centered design, and there are already examples of 
using stories to elicit insights from users in relation to security and 
privacy (e.g. [28]). But we may also think about the ways 
technologies may be explicitly designed and deployed to provoke 
reaction and reflection upon personal practices. One such 
approach might be to develop technology probes [17], which are 
“technologies deployed to find out about the unknown”. These are 
not technology ‘solutions’ in the traditional sense, but are 
designed to reveal information about the context and relationships 
between the people with whom it is deployed. The deployment 
serves to collect data about the people using it and the context, to 
test technology prototypes, and to stimulate new ideas for future 
iterations, and ultimately to support theorizing around the 
requirements for a new technology in that context. This is a 
technique that could be deployed at an early stage of a design 
process to gather some early data from the field study to inform 
later prototypes. While these probes can be relatively benign in 
nature, these probes could be provocatively designed to 
deliberately conflict with some aspect of the user’s values. Vines 
et al. [36] designed the Digital Chequebook, which was intended 
to confront the resistance of their group of older users to modern 
payment technologies; Vlachokyriakos et al. [39] created a digital 
voting probe. The purpose of such development and deployment is 
to create use contexts around technology in which users are 
prompted to share, defend, or reconsider their values.  
9. CONCLUSION 
As the contexts where technology is experienced change, so does 
the way people value and interact with security and privacy 
technologies. In this paper we have argued that an experience-
centered [20,21] design approach to the study and design of 
security and privacy technologies is valuable here. By describing 
three case studies we highlighted how innovative non-typical 
research methods can yield insights into experiences of security 
and privacy and facilitate user creativity in envisioning future 
technologies for their own benefit. Finally, we suggest a number 
of areas to focus future research activity to bring an experiential 
perspective on old, long-standing problems, and ultimately serve 
as a tool for researchers to capture and design for the complexities 
of the experiential aspects of privacy and security technologies.  
10. WORKSHOP DISCUSSION 
During the workshop, many interesting questions were raised 
around the paper, a few of which we find helpful to capture in this 
section of the paper.  
10.1 Is this new paradigm simply suggesting 
that we should just ask people different kinds 
of questions in our studies? 
The new paradigm is the prioritization of people’s subjective 
experiences of security and privacy technologies as the focus of 
study. This places people and their lived experience as core item 
of curiosity rather than just their performance using a new 
technology. Different research methods have different 
affordances. Traditional interviews and surveys tap into a very 
rational mode of human thinking, which can elicit self-
descriptions of practices that depict an ideal that is seldom met 
[25]. Experience-centered design takes that to explore and 
understand lived experiences (which are innately subjective) we 
need a different class of methods based upon dialogue that must 
recognize: people’s behavior is interesting and won’t be judged; 
the need to develop ways to help people articulate tacit behaviors 
to researchers; researchers must work together with people to 
make sense of the insights that emerge. Much of our skilled 
behavior is not conscious, and an experience-centered design 
process is about applying methods that make that subjective, tacit 
knowledge visible. Experience-centered privacy and security is 
about understanding how the methods of experience-centered 
design can help us do better user-facing security and privacy. 
10.2 Designing security and privacy is different 
from any other technology design due to the 
presence of an adversary. How is this 
accounted for in this paradigm? 
It is true that security and privacy designers must contend with 
two classes of users; i) the target users; ii) the adversaries. 
Historically, security research was born out of a focus upon the 
adversary, and the area of usable privacy and security came about 
to help redress this imbalance. Overall it is necessary to strike a 
balance between the consideration of both groups. In this paper, 
we have focused very much on the target users, but that is not to 
say that future experience-centered privacy and security cannot 
contribute to discussion around the role of the adversary. 
Experience-centered methods acknowledge that people have their 
differences, and seeks to understand how groups of people might 
see the world differently. While we clearly would not wish to 
design technologies to support adversaries, it is always valuable to 
understand users better. The book of Kevin Mitnick [23] stands as 
one classic resource that presents insights into the motivations and 
activities of a motivated and clever adversary. Today however, the 
distinction between the two user groups can be more nuanced; in 
our first case study we described how social network users – non-
experts in computer security -- could be both the hunter and the 
hunted when conducting themselves online, and would 
promiscuously seek information about others, without any 
reflection on this as a negative or anti-social behavior. A greater 
curiosity around this phenomenon (for example) could provide 
new opportunities to study how and why people switch between 
these two roles in their everyday lives.  
Promising work already exists that seeks to uncover people’s 
understanding of the difference between the two user groups. 
Wash [40] explored how one group of users (the target group) 
conceptualized the other group (the adversaries) in discussions 
around botnets and viruses.  
10.3 Given a project with finite time and 
money, how can we incorporate such research 
methods into the development lifecycle? 
All three of the methods we describe in this paper were applied 
longitudinally. However, all research methods represent a 
compromise in terms of time and money. Some methods require 
more time to apply or are more high risk than others, regardless of 
the methodology. The goal in any research is to apply an 
appropriate mix of methods that take account of resource 
constraints, yet still make a meaningful contribution towards 
answering the research questions. There are a variety of 
experience-centered methods that can be called upon that require a 
much shorter time commitment [43]. 
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